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Abstract
How, and to what extent, does an interconnected financial system endogenously
amplify external shocks? This paper attempts to reconcile some apparently differ-
ent views emerged after the 2008 crisis regarding the nature and the relevance of
contagion in financial networks. We develop a common framework encompassing
several network contagion models and show that, regardless of the shock distribution
and the network topology, precise ordering relationships on the level of aggregate
systemic losses hold among models.
We argue that the extent of contagion crucially depends on the amount of infor-
mation that each model assumes to be available to market players. Under no un-
certainty about the network structure and values of external assets, the well-known
Eisenberg and Noe (2001) model applies, which delivers the lowest level of conta-
gion. This is due to a property of loss conservation: aggregate losses after contagion
are equal to the losses incurred by those institutions initially hit by a shock. This
property implies that many contagion analyses rule out by construction any loss am-
plification, treating de facto an interconnected system as a single aggregate entity,
where losses are simply mutualised. Under higher levels of uncertainty, as captured
for instance by the DebtRank model, losses become non-conservative and get com-
pounded through the network. This has important policy implications: by reducing
the levels of uncertainty in times of distress (e.g. by obtaining specific data on the
network) policymakers would be able to move towards more conservative scenarios.
Empirically, we compare the magnitude of contagion across models on a sample of
the largest European banks during the years 2006- 2016. In particular, we analyse
contagion effects as a function of the size of the shock and the type of external assets
shocked.
Keywords: financial network, financial contagion, leverage network, loss conserva-
tion, loss amplification, Eisenberg-Noe, DebtRank
∗Corresponding author: marco.derrico@uzh.ch
Acknowledgments: we are grateful to Joseph Stiglitz and Tarik Roukny for discussions and comments.
GV, SB and MDE acknowledge support from the FET Project SIMPOL nr. 610704, FET project
DOLFINS nr 640772, and the Swiss National Fund Professorship grant no. PP00P1-144689.
1
ar
X
iv
:1
60
8.
07
83
1v
1 
 [q
-fi
n.R
M
]  
28
 A
ug
 20
16
Contents
1 Introduction 3
2 A general framework for contagion models 7
2.1 Leverage networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2 First and second round effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3 Conservation versus amplification of losses 9
3.1 Partial ordering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.2 Conservation of losses in EN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4 Empirical application 14
4.1 Vulnerability in time across asset classes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.2 Vulnerability for different shocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.3 Vulnerability for different recovery rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
5 Discussion and policy relevance 21
SI Supplementary Information 24
SI.1 Five contagion models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
SI.1.1 Eisenberg-Noe model (EN) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
SI.1.2 Rogers-Veraart model (RV) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
SI.1.3 Default Cascades model (DC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
SI.1.4 Acyclic DebtRank model (aDR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
SI.1.5 Cyclic DebtRank (cDR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
SI.2 Analytical results on systemic losses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
SI.2.1 Ordering relations between EN, RV, DC, DR . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
SI.2.2 Conservation of losses in EN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
SI.3 Illustrative examples on EN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
SI.3.1 Mutualization of losses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
SI.3.2 Invariance with respect to network topology . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
SI.4 Data collection and processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
SI.5 Network reconstruction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2
1 Introduction
Coping with financial crises may carry considerable social costs. Ideally, such costs would
need to be correctly quantified and minimised while, at the same time, ensuring that
the key functions of the financial system continue to work also under times of distress.
Most of the regulator’s attention at the onset of the 2007-2008 crisis has been devoted
to reducing the probability of widespread default contagion by bailing-out systemically
important financial institutions in the fear that they might be “too big to fail” (TBTF)
or “too interconnected to fail” and that their default would lead to severe system-wide
consequences. The need to understand the implications of interconnectedness and its con-
sequences in terms of systemic risk has been often emphasized by high-level policymakers
in the EU and the US1 and it has motivated policy responses and substantial revisions of
the regulatory framework.2
Where does this interconnectedness arise? As a matter of fact, a large share of the
activities of financial institutions (including banks and other financial players) is inter-
financial, i.e. it involves contracts between financial institutions themselves. The analysis
of Allahrakha et al. (2015), for instance, reports a share of intrafinancial exposures between
about 5% and 40% for the top six banking groups in the US (in our empirical analysis of a
sample of EU banks, we find similar numbers). About half these exposures are Over The
Counter (OTC) derivatives (i.e. derivative financial contracts traded bilaterally). Several
authors (see, for instance, Stulz, 2010; European Central Bank, 2009; Cont, 2010) have
analysed the role of Credit Default Swaps (CDS) in determining systemic risk. As noted
by the New York FED, “the financial crisis of 2008 exposed significant weaknesses in the
over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives market”.3
The share of inter-financial activities has been increasing over the last decades: Allen and
Santomero (1997), for instance, challenge the standard view of the intermediary role of
the financial system and argue that these process has led to the creation of “markets for
intermediaries rather than individuals or firms”.
Is this interconnectedness a problem in terms of systemic contagion? A first stream
of literature focuses on counterfactual simulations to assess the possibility and severity
of contagion through national interbank lending markets.4 All these studies implement
1Yellen (2013) argues that “some degree of interconnectedness is vital to the functioning of our financial
system [. . . ] Yet experience – most importantly, our recent financial crisis – as well as a growing body of
academic research suggests that interconnections among financial intermediaries are not an unalloyed good
Draghi (2013) holds that “the process of financial integration has created a myriad of complex linkages
within the EU financial system” and “a more holistic view of interlinkages in the financial system is
needed to understand how shocks are transmitted across the system and how to mitigate them”.
2For instance, the the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act in the US and
the European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) in the EU.
3https://www.newyorkfed.org/financial-services-and-infrastructure/
financial-market-infrastructure-and-reform/over-the-counter-derivatives/index.html
4Among other works, Furfine (2003) for the United States, Amundsen and Arnt (2005) for Denmark,
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models of sequential defaults (Upper, 2011) in which the bankruptcy of one institution
reduces the equity of its counterparties by failing to honor its liabilities, either applying
the methodologies of Eisenberg and Noe (2001) or Furfine (2003).
The general finding of these counterfactual simulations is that the likelihood of domino-
effects resulting from interbank exposures is negligible, even though the potential losses
associated with the occurence of such events can be of systemic importance (Elsinger
et al., 2006; Upper, 2011). Further extensions of the Eisenberg-Noe model have included
bankrupcty costs (Rogers and Veraart, 2013) or cross equity holdings (Elsinger et al.,
2009), without substantially altering the main conclusions.
In their pioneering work, Kiyotaki and Moore (2002) divide contagion into indirect and
direct. The latter refers indeed to a channel arising when “firms simultaneously borrow
from and lend to each other”. The indirect channel has also received attention in years
after the crisis: a firm’s actions generate externalities that affect other firms through
non-contractual channels (Clerc et al., 2016). Works on fire-sales (Cifuentes et al., 2005),
bank runs (Iyer and Peydro, 2011), information contagion (Helwege and Zhang, 2013) and
liquidity risk (Iyer et al., 2014) have highlighted the importance of such indirect channels.
A stream of literature has suggested that direct contagion may take place well-before the
threshold of default as in the EN model and lead to substantial distress even without
outright defaults. For instance, the DebtRank methodology (Battiston et al., 2012b) is
based on a recursive process on the network of liabilities where shock transmission takes
place even without the default of a counterparty, and has been adopted, e.g. in (Zlatic´
et al., 2015; de Souza et al., 2016). As remarked in (Battiston et al., 2015, 2016a; Bardoscia
et al., 2016) DebtRank moves towards extending the classical structural approach of
Merton (1974) within a network of liabilities. This is precisely modeled in Barucca et al.
(2016).
A reduced likelihood of repayment can be determined by different levels and types of
uncertainty. Indeed, during the last financial crisis, uncertainty dominated the financial
system. As noted by Haldane (2009), when Lehman filed for bankruptcy, “Panic ensued.
Uncertainty about its causes and contagious consequences brought many financial markets
and institutions to a standstill”. Other agents in the financial system (whether directly
or indirectly exposed) were uncertain about how much they would recover from Lehman.
The idea that uncertainty about the recovery rate is crucial for the amount of contagion
is put forward also in a recent work by Battiston et al. (2016c): in their model, the levels
of uncertainty compounds multiplicatively along chains of connected banks.
International policy organisations have conducted ex-post analyses of the losses emerged
during the crisis that support the view that the endogenous mark-to-market re-evaluations
Bl˚avarg and Nimander (2002) and Frisell et al. (2007) for Sweden, Degryse and Nguyen (2007) for Belgium,
Elsinger et al. (2006) for Austria, Wells (2004) and Elsinger et al. (2005) for the United Kingdom, Graf
et al. (2005) for Mexico, Lublo´y (2005) for Hungary, Mistrulli (2011) for Italy, Sheldon et al. (1998) and
Mu¨ller (2006) for Switzerland, Toivanen (2009) for Finland, Upper and Worms (2004) for Germany and
Van Lelyveld and Liedorp (2004) for the Netherlands.
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of claims, due to the decline in counterparties’ ability to repay due obligations, have caused
large losses, if not even the biggest part. For instance, BCBS (2011) report that 2/3 of
losses were due to Credit Valuation Adjustments (CVA) rather than direct defaults; the
Financial Services Authority (2010), report a value of 4/5 of losses. CVA implies a re-
evaluation of the market value of an asset by taking into account the increased likelihood
of default of a counterparty and it is largely applied to OTC derivatives, which are largely
interfinancial (D’Errico et al., 2016; Abad et al., 2016).5 This shows that a default based
process may be insufficient to explain the extent of systemic contagion.6 As a result,
when balance sheet values are marked-to-market, valuation and contagion are strictly
interrelated and may create potential feedback loops and further devaluation spirals.
This leads to the question: does interconnectedness matter in determining contagion? In
order to provide an answer, we develop the a framework based on the concept of leverage
network (Section 2) in which we compare (Section 3) the losses across five main different
contagion models:
• the Eisenberg and Noe (2001) model (EN),
• the Rogers and Veraart (2013) model (RV),
• the Default Cascades (DC) model (Battiston et al., 2012a; Roukny et al., 2013),
• the acyclic DebtRank (aDR) model (Battiston et al., 2012b, 2015, 2016a),
• cyclic DebtRank (cDR) model (Bardoscia et al., 2015; Barucca et al., 2016).
As analytically shown in (Barucca et al., 2016), all these models, including the EN model,
can be interpreted as a re-evaluation of interfinancial claims under certain conditions.
Moreover, the latter two models explicitly capture a CVA-type of accounting framework.
As a first contribution, we provide precise ordering relations in terms of total systemic
equity loss according to the different models. Importantly, such relations hold regardless
of i) the underlying network structure and ii) the original shock distribution. In this
ordering relations, the EN contagion model gives the least possible losses followed by the
RV model and by the cyclic version of DebtRank and the differences in estimated losses
between models can be substantial. This implies that the differences in the assumptions
of the various models (and in what they are able to capture) is key for assessing the
extent of contagion. Notice that in the EN and RV models the only event that matters
for the transmission of distress from a bank to another is its default. As a result, the
value of a claim on a bank’s debt is not at all affected by a loss of equity of that bank as
long as the equity is positive, while in case of default of the bank the value of the claim
5See also Burnham (1991), Flood (1994) and Lyons (1997), for theoretical and empirical analysis on
the FX market.
6The theoretical contribution by Glasserman and Young (2015) find than, under an EN approach
contagion is not likely and point towards the inclusion of other mechanisms.
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for their counterparties is, recursively, a proportional share of all the remaining assets
of the bank including what the bank could recover from its own defaulting obligors. In
particular, losses that exceed the equity of a bank are mutualized by the defaulting bank’
counterparties as in a sort of system of communicating vessels where the water in excess
of one vessel moves to the next but the total amount of water remains constant.
Our second contribution is to emphasise that an important conservation property holds
for the EN model: the total final losses suffered by banks and their creditors at the end
of the contagion process are simply equal to the total initial losses on the external assets
of the banks suffering the first shock. This property, which has often gone unnoticed,
implies that the possibility of a shock amplification through the network is ruled out by
construction and that the interbank network is equivalent in terms of aggregate losses to
a single aggregate bank. The other implicit assumptions of the EN model are related to
the certainty in how much each counterparty will recover from the others (there are no
bankruptcy costs and assets are liquidated at book value) and how payments are enforced.
Moving towards more uncertainty on the network structure and on the recovery rate
makes the contagion process no longer conservative: the final total losses in the system
are higher than the initial shock. In the RV model, for example, losses are computed
recursively taking into account a discount factor for the interbank liabilities. This factors
compounds in the network, lowering the final recovery rate. Yet, the RV model assumes
full knowledge on the network of liabilities and external asset values. When further
uncertainty on external and interfinancial assets (i.e., the network) ensues, a full mark-
to-market/CVA must be applied and an approach such as DR is more suitable. This
approach leads to even higher levels of losses.
As a third (empirical) contribution, in Section 4, we apply the stress-test framework in
a cross-national setting, studying the vulnerability of the top 50 publicly listed banks on
the EU interbank lending market from 2005 − Q4 to 2015 − Q3.7 We also compare the
behavior of the different models across several dimensions in the space of parameters,
such as the magnitude of external shock and exogenous recovery rates, identifying the
limits under which different models yield similar results. Our empirical results reflect the
theoretical findings: sequential default models (like the Eisenberg-Noe model) constantly
yield lower equity losses than mark-to-market-based models.
Finally, we discuss (Section 5) the implications of our results, especially from a policy
perspective. In fact, our paper provides theoretical ground for policy actions aimed at
mitigating systemic risk in times of crises. Increasing information about the network
structure and other holdings of market participants is available, policymakers may move
the financial system towards a more conservative setting by curbing uncertainty. We
discuss also the types of policies that may lead to these specific desirable results. However,
further work is needed to understand their actual implementation in the current complex
financial landscape.
7Though pure interbank loans are not subject to a mark-to-market reevaluation, we focus on interbank
loans as a benchmark case to assess the magnitude of the loss.
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2 A general framework for contagion models
2.1 Leverage networks
In order to compare different contagion models we hereby provide a coherent, unified
framework of definitions. In what follows we will outline such a framework and review all
the models analyzed.
Consider a set of n financial institutions (hereafter called banks) with nominal liabilities
to each other. Let Lb be the interbank liability matrix, whose entry Lbij represents the
nominal value of the liability of bank i to bank j. It is worth to stress that the liability Lbij
can represent any type inter-financial contract, including OTC derivatives (cleared and
uncleared), bonds, etc.: our theoretical analysis, therefore, is not limited to interbank
loans.8
We can represent this financial system as a directed graph (or network) with weighted
adjacency matrix given by the interbank liabilities matrix Lb, in which each bank is a
node. Associated with the matrix Lb is its transpose, which we call the interbank assets
matrix and denote by Ab, whose entry Abij = L
b
ji represents the nominal value of bank i’s
claim on bank j. Banks invest also in m external assets, such that their total amounts to
Aei =
∑m
k=1A
e
ik, where A
e
ik is the amount invested by bank i in asset class k; moreover,
they have external liabilities, Lei , that is liabilities to entities outside of the inter-financial
network. Denoting by Ei the equity of i, the balance sheet identity for each node in the
network is therefore given by the following expression:
Ei = Ai − Li = Aei + Abi − (Lei + Lbi) =
m∑
k=1
Aeik +
n∑
j=1
Abij − Lei −
n∑
j=1
Lbij (1)
One of the key quantities in our framework is the leverage of bank i, defined as
li = Ai
/
Ei. (2)
The leverage ratio can be interpreted (Battiston et al., 2016a) as the multiplicative factor
that relates a decrease in the value of the assets with the losses in equity it induces. In
fact, given a negative relative shock, s ∈ [0, 1], in the value of the assets, the fraction of
equity needed to respect identity (1) is readily computed as min{1, li × s}.
Another simple interpretation is that the leverage ratio can be viewed as the reciprocal
of the minimum relative decrease (negative shock) in the value of assets that leads to
Ei = 0, i.e. i’s equity is completely used in order to absorb the shock.
9
8The current framework does not apply straightforwardly, though, in the presence of a specific type of
financial network with CDS contracts written on the very same financial institutions, as in Schuldenzucker
et al. (2016).
9See, e.g., Gros (2010), for a discussion about this interpretation of the leverage ratio within different
accounting frameworks.
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The framework is based on the decomposition of the leverage ratio into additive compo-
nents, as introduced in (Battiston et al., 2015, 2016a). The leverage ratio of i with respect
to asset k is defined as the ratio between the value of the asset and the equity of the
bank, leik = A
e
ik/Ei. The same applies to interbank exposures, and l
b
ij is the leverage of
i towards j. Therefore the total leverage li can be additively decomposed along external
assets and interbank assets in the following way:
li =
∑m
k=1A
e
ik +
∑n
j=1A
b
ij
Ei
=
m∑
k=1
leik +
n∑
j=1
lbij (3)
We call the matrices whose elements are leik and l
b
ij the external leverage matrix and
the interbank leverage matrix respectively. To these matrices are naturally associated a
bipartite leverage network banks/assets and a monopartite leverage network banks/banks.
2.2 First and second round effects
In general, given a model of financial contagion, we are interested in assessing how the
losses induced by a shock, s, on the external assets of some banks (first round effects)
propagate and amplify to the other banks in the network (second round effects).
We show that all contagion models considered in this work can be equivalently refor-
mulated as discrete-time recursive processes10 on the leverage network. Each process
prescribes how a certain balance sheet quantity (e.g. total liabilities or equity) evolves,
compatibly with accounting rules and key assumptions related to each model, up until
convergence is reached.
Without loss of generality and independently of the details of any model implementation,
we can define a time scale11 for this process of stress-testing (compatibly with the general
framework proposed in Battiston et al. (2016a)) as in Table 1:
As a convenient placeholder we will indicate with t = ∞ the time of convergence of any
model, even in those cases in which the model reaches convergence in finite time.12
The focus of the generalised framework of this paper is on the following two main quan-
tities:
1. the individual vulnerability of bank i
hi(t) =
Ei(0)− Ei(t)
Ei(0)
∈ [0, 1] (4)
10Even models framed as fixed-point problems, like the Eisenberg-Noe and Rogers-Veraart models
ultimately admit a discrete-time process solution, like the Fictitious Default Algorithm.
11Time here refers to the internal time of the process itself, or algorithmic time, and not physical time
in any way.
12We further notice that all the models considered can equivalently be re-phrased in terms of fixed-
points, so that at convergence if we proceed iterating the dynamics, we will always remain at the fixed-
point, without further changes in the system
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Time Round Effects
t = 0 Initial allocation Initial conditions for model, resources are
allocated according to nominal values
t = 1 First round Shock on external assets, loss on balance sheets
t = 2 Second round begins Reverberation of first round losses on the interbank network
according to the model’s dynamics
t =∞ Second round ends Model reaches convergence
Table 1: Outline of distress process in the general framework.
defined as the relative cumulative equity loss of bank i up to time t,
2. the global vulnerability of the system
H(t) =
Etot(0)− Etot(t)
Etot(0)
=
n∑
i=1
Ei(0)∑n
j=1Ej(0)
hi(t) ∈ [0, 1] (5)
defined as the relative cumulative equity loss of the system up to time t.
Clearly hi(t) = 1 if bank i has defaulted
13 at any time up to time t. Further, we assume
that for the entire duration of the stress-test no “injection” of equity is performed, so that
hi(t) is non-decreasing in t , i.e. hi(t) ≥ hi(t− 1).
These quantities have the obvious advantage of providing the monetary value of losses
in equity incurred by the system (upon multiplying by initial equity) and are compat-
ible with the principle of limited liability, allowing us to compare different models in a
straightforward way.
3 Conservation versus amplification of losses
We now explore how contagion can lead to more or less shock amplification in the finan-
cial system discussing the analytical results contained in the SI. We show that, when a
sufficient amount of information on the network is available, so that the EN model can be
13Compatibly with modern literature, we assume that a default event is triggered when the bank is
insolvent, ie. its liabilities are greater than its assets. For such a defaulted bank we define its equity to
be exactly zero, Ei = 0, in accordance with the principle of limited liability
9
implemented, the system is conservative, i.e. initial losses are not amplified. Increasing
the uncertainty leads to larger losses and less conservative scenarios.
3.1 Partial ordering
Within the leverage network framework, we prove that, independently of the network
structure and shock distribution, there exists a general partial ordering among the five
different models in terms of individual and global vulnerabilities.
Preliminary to the analysis, we show in Proposition 1 that the EN and RV models can
be re-expressed in terms of individual vulnerabilities, thus allowing a direct comparison
across the models. A general overview of the models’ main assumptions and features is
outlined in Table 2.
Model Set of active nodes Contagion mechanism
EN Defaulted banks
hi(t) = 1
Counterparty default losses
Endogenous recovery rate
RV Defaulted banks
hi(t) = 1
Counterparty default losses
Endogenous and
exogenous recovery rate
DC Defaulted banks
hi(t) = 1 and hi(t− 1) < 1
Counterparty default losses
Exogenous recovery rate
(propagation only once)
aDR Distressed banks
hi(t) > 0 and hi(t− 1) = 0
Counterparty default and mark-to-market losses
Exogenous recovery rate
(propagation only once)
cDR
Distressed banks
hi(t) > 0
Counterparty default and mark-to-market losses
Exogenous recovery rate
Table 2: Summary of properties of distress propagation models.
Then, we prove that the following chain of inequalities is always satisfied (see Propositions
2, 3):
HEN(t) ≤ HRV(t) ≤ HcDR(t). (6)
This result asserts that models that allow distress propagation only in the event of defaults,
such as the EN and RV models, always yield lower vulnerability values than particular
models incorporating MtM losses, thus corroborating the empirical evidence (see Introduc-
tion) that the greatest part of counterparty risk losses are determined by mark-to-market
accounting more than outright defaults.
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We further establish that for the case of the aDR model no such relationship holds and
that in general
HEN(t)  HaDR(t), HDC(t)  HaDR(t). (7)
This is a direct consequence of the fact that the aDR model, despite implementing MtM
losses, allows banks to propagate distress only once. This feature can be exploited to
build pathological counterexamples in which the EN, RV and DC model predict higher
vulnerabilities (see Propositions 4, 5). Nevertheless it is important to emphasize that
such a situation requires a certain degree of fine-tuning in the choice of parameters and
underlying network structure, resulting in a rather unrealistic financial system.
We remark that in the case of all reconstructed financial networks analyzed in our em-
pirical application, the following stable order relationship among models is satisfied (for
instance, see Figure 1):
HEN(t) ≤ HDC(t) ≤ HRV(t) ≤ HaDR(t) ≤ HcDR(t). (8)
As outlined in the Introduction, a large body of work on contagion is based on the EN
model, which systematically yields very low second round effects, followed by the other
models, where the interplay between the recovery rate and increasing uncertainty yields
to increasingly higher losses.
Why does the EN lead to very low losses? The answer lies in a specific property of this
model, i.e. that initial losses are conserved, as we shall see in the following.
3.2 Conservation of losses in EN
An important aspect of the EN model is that it was originally conceived (Eisenberg and
Noe, 2001) as a clearing algorithm, attempting to find a solution for the problem of
payments among a set of interconnected firms, with a set of endogenous endowments that
are less than the nominal value of the liabilities in the system (in our framework this is
captured by an initial exogenous shock). Their main claim is that not only a solution for
the clearing problem exists, but that - under mild assumptions - it is unique.14
Indeed, looking more in depth, the EN method requires a series of precise conditions
that need to be met in order to be implemented. These conditions represent implicit
assumptions for the application of the model in a real setting. Overall, they lead to
reduced sources of uncertainty and allow to reach an optimal clearing in a network of
interfinancial exposures. Among others, some of the assumptions are:
14The solution to the clearing problem can be found either via a fixed-point argument or via a linear
program. Using the latter approach, for example, Liu and Staum (2010) provides a detailed sensitivity
analysis of the problem.
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1. External shocks are fully known and fixed in time; Barucca et al. (2016) show that,
when external shocks follow a stochastic process, instead, the valuation has to be
closer to the one performed in the DebtRank model;
2. Complete knowledge of banks’ balance sheets, which implies further,
3. the complete knowledge of the network; which would have eliminated a large source
of uncertainty in the system during the financial crisis as described by Haldane
(2009).
4. All agents abide to the payment solution proposed to them given by the clearing
algorithm (no uncertainty in the payments out and in) which would rule out uncer-
tainty due to the possibility of defection. Should one of the participants refuse to
pay the amount, the whole clearing process should be repeated, leading to further
possible defections.
5. Institutions have full recovery of external assets, thus excluding any fire sales and
liquidity costs.
6. There are no bankruptcy costs, no default would lead to a (potentially lengthy)
process of unwinding of positions.
7. Even a complete default (no remaining equity) is not enough for a node i to propagate
distress onto its neighbours: the shortfall in payments due by i needs to exceed its
equity level in order to be spread to other nodes.
8. At default, all remaining assets are liquidated immediately and with certainty. This
implies that counterparties should not react to any changes (however large) in the
equity levels of their obligor and patiently wait until all external and interbank
assets are used (this is in contrast with current accounting practice and with the
Merton (1974) approach).
In particular, complete knowledge of interbank exposures and full compliance to the clear-
ing system imply the existence of an omniscent, omnipotent central agent able to collect
data and fully enforce payments (via binding legal agreements), guaranteeing optimal
market clearing. Whether or not this can be achieved in a non-centralised way remains
an open problem.
Under the global clearing mechanism implemented in the EN model, losses are conserved
and fully mutualized among banks, thus leading to negligible second-round contagion
effects (Propositions 6, 7, and 8). This allows us to provide an explicit closed-form
HEN(∞) = 1∑n
i=1Ei(0)
n∑
i=1
(
Aeisi − (1− βi)(p¯i − pi(∞))
)
(9)
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where si is the shock on the external assets of bank i and βi is its financial connectivity,
i.e. the fraction of i′s liabilities held by other banks. The term p¯i − pi(∞) represents
the total shortfall in payments of i. In the summation of Equation (9) the term Aeisi
represents the loss in external assets of bank i, while the term (1 − βi)(p¯i − p∗i ) (which
is non-zero only if bank i defaults) represents that portion of external liabilities that are
written-off. Clearly, if βi = 1,∀i, the total equity losses are equal to the total initial
shocks on external assets, while second round losses are simply equal to those losses in
external assets that are in excess of the equity of the banks defaulting during the first
round. If βi < 1, part of the shortfall in payments is borne by external debtholders (e.g.
depositors).
In a sense, the two terms have opposite effects: the shortfalls in payments that external
debtholders (for instance, depositors) are forced to endure represent financial distress that
flows out of the system (hence the minus sign in front of the second term), thus reducing
the second round losses that are passed onto counterparties of defaulting institutions.
We can obtain the following upper bound on second round losses (see Proposition 8):
HEN(∞)−HEN(1) ≤ 1∑n
i=1Ei(0)
∑
i∈D(1)
βi
(
Aeisi − Ei(0)
)
.
where D(1) is the set of banks that default as a consequence of the first round shock on
external assets.
We see that losses due to contagion are solely due to those first round losses that defaulting
banks’ equity cannot absorb at the end of the first round.15
For instance, if bank i defaults as a consequence of first round losses, then a fraction
1− βi of losses in excess of its equity flows out of the network, as discussed above, while
a fraction βi is passed onto its counterparties in the network and alone contributed to
second round effects. The network then acts as a system of communicating vessels: bank
i’s counterparties try to absorb these losses until their equity is exhausted and, if a default
is triggered, they proceed to write-off external liabilities (thus determining further out-flow
of distress) and interbank liabilities (thus passing distress onto their own counterparties).
The process ends when all those initial losses have been re-distributed along the chain
of counterparties and/or externalized onto depositors. Clearly, the worst-case scenario
for the financial system is that in which βi = 1, ∀i, i.e. banks do not have outside
liabilities and have to internalize all shocks. Interbank losses are then maximized and the
conservation law is even clearer and reads:
HEN(∞)×∑ni=1 Ei(0) = [∑iEi(0)−∑iEi(∞)] =
= [
∑
i (Ei(0)− Ei(∞))] =
∑
i siA
e
i
(10)
15Indeed, in the original paper, Eisenberg and Noe (2001) had provided this very intuition “the financial
system is conservative, neither creating nor destroying value”. Within our framework, this is explicitly
proven in SI.2.2.
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It can be readily observed that equity losses in the system are thus exactly equal to the
losses in assets determined by the initial external shock. The clearing mechanism simply
re-distributes distress in the network in such a way that no amplification is observed.
Dividing Equation (10) by the original total equity in the system, one obtains (assuming
a common shock si = s, ∀i):
HEN(∞) = 1−
∑
iEi(∞)∑
iEi(0)
= s
∑
iA
e
i∑
iEi
= slesys (11)
Thus the final equity loss in the system is independent of the underlying network topology
(see examples in Section SI.3) and is solely a function of the external shock and the total
leverage of the system.
Therefore, the implementation of the EN clearing mechanism is equivalent to aggregating
all the balance sheets of the banks and computing first round losses on the aggregated
entity: the structure and arrangement of the internal connections between individual
balance sheets is irrelevant for the computation of the final losses ultimately shouldered
by the financial system. From the point of view of a policymaker quantifying the amount
of equity injection in the system during a crisis, all that matters is the original shock and
the fraction of external debt.
This means that, despite the original formulation as a recursive process on networks, in
the EN model the banking system acts as a single bank with an aggregate balance sheet
and satisfies the principle of conservation of losses. Therefore the algorithm is needed
soley for the correct individual attribution of losses, which would incentivize participants
to adopt the clearing algorithm, rather than for an aggregate assessment.
4 Empirical application
We apply the stress-test framework presented in Section 2 in a cross-national setting,
studying the vulnerability of the top 50 publicly listed banks on the EU interbank lending
market according to the different models. We have collected quarterly balance sheet data
for these banks from 2005-Q4 to 2015-Q3.16
For each quarter in our dataset we proceed to reconstruct 1000 realizations of the network
of interbank exposures via a modified fitness model (de Masi et al., 2006; Musmeci et al.,
2013; Cimini et al., 2015b,a; Battiston et al., 2016a), as explained in more detail in Section
SI.5. For each quarter, we run the five different models17 on every realization of the 1000
interbank networks and compare the resulting median global vulnerabilities.
We explore the behavior of the different models across several dimensions in the space of
parameters, in particular we study how global vulnerabilities are affected by:
• different asset classes (all external assets, derivatives and impaired loans)
16Details concerning data collection and processing can be found in Section SI.4
17For background information on the models, see Section SI.1
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• varying magnitude of external shocks
• varying exogenous recovery rates
and we identify the limits under which different models yield similar results.
4.1 Vulnerability in time across asset classes
As a starting point we compute first round, H(1), and second round, H(∞), losses18 for a
1% fixed shock on the external assets of each bank and compare models across the whole
period 2005-Q4 - 2015-Q3, on a quarterly basis.
Figure 1: Global vulnerability, H, in time for a 1% shock on external assets. “First round”
corresponds to H(1), identical across all models. Second round, H(∞), for each of
the five models.
Figure 1 presents the results of such a simulation. The global vulnerability for the EN
model, HEN(∞), is almost identical to the first round and covers it entirely in the picture,
while the DC model lies underneath the RV model.
We notice that the aDR and cDR models constantly result in higher levels of vulnerability,
while the DC model yields only slightly smaller values than the RV model. That this is
always the case is demonstrated analytically in Section SI.2.1, together with several other
relations among the models.
18Notice that the value of H(1), depending only on the initial balance sheets and external shock, is
identical for all models. Only second round effects, quantified as H(∞), are different, since they’re the
result of the particular dynamics of the individual contagion processes
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This, in particular, implies that the models explicitly integrating the practice of mark-to-
market accounting are able to take into account losses due to CVA that the standard EN
and RV model simply cannot capture.
It is also evident that the EN model fails to produce any visible second round effect, even
though the banking system in that period faced its biggest financial crisis since 1929. This
is the result of several assumptions underlying the EN model, as illustrated in Section 3.1
and proved analytically in Section SI.2.2, that indicate that the EN model is not suited for
stress-testing. In this regard it is particularly worrying that most practitioners used this
model in reaching the conclusion that financial contagion through the interbank market
is unlikely. Our findings prove that the EN model, created as a clearing payment system,
was indeed designed to minimize this kind of losses and all the assumptions on which it’s
based are clearly non satisfied in a context of stress-testing.
It is worth emphasizing that, nevertheless, the RV model, thanks to the implementation
of an exogenous recovery rate, is able to capture a portion of the equity losses at times
when financial distress was at its peak (namely the first quarters of 2009, when EU banks
registered the highest losses in market capitalization, and the 2012-2013 sovereign debt
and Greek crises). But these second round effects are limited to the periods of greatest
strain in the system and can simply be used to identify periods of full-fledged crisis when
it is well under way. In contrast, the aDR and cDR models provide visible trends in second
round effects, clearly showing a build-up of vulnerability in the years preceeding the crisis
and a generalized easing of conditions later on. In particular, as indicated by Battiston
et al. (2016b) and Bardoscia et al. (2016), the values for cDR can be conveniently related
to the first eigenvalue of the leverage matrix.
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Figure 2: Global vulnerability, H, in time for a 5% shock on all derivatives. “First round”
corresponds to H(1), identical across all models. Second round, H(∞), for each of
the five models.
Figure 3: Global vulnerability, H, in time for a 40% shock on all impaired loans. “First round”
corresponds to H(1), identical across all models. Second round, H(∞), for each of
the five models.
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Figures 2 and 3 show exactly the same results for shocks19 on different asset classes,
namely a shock of 7% on all derivatives and a shock of 40% on all impaired loans20.
The decomposition of contagion through particular asset classes allows us to identify the
assets that most contribute to fragility in the system and to understand how systemic
risk migrates from one typology of investment to another.
Derivatives, for example, appear to have contributed strongly to the vulnerability of banks
during the financial crisis because they were particularly leveraged with respect to this
kind of instruments.
Impaired loans, on the other hand, seem to pose a systemic risk mainly in times of
recession,21 when sluggish growth in the real economy implies higher default probabilities
on retail, residential and commercial loans.
19We do not seek to justify this particular choice of shocks on derivatives and impaired loans, since
this is meant to be a comparative analysis of different distress models and not an actual stress-test. The
magnitude of these shocks has therefore been chosen in such a way that first round losses are roughly
comparable with the 1% shock presented in Figure 1
20Banks have considerable discretion in how they classify impaired loans and there is no commonly
accepted definition. A loan is usually defined impaired when payments are 90+ days overdue, but in our
dataset, as in the case of all data providers, the figure of impaired loans might be undereported
21It must be emphasized nevertheless how the widespread securitisation of loans, especially sub-
standard ones, might have contributed substantially to the financial crisis, but due to the fact that
these assets were registered off the balance sheets of most banks, we couldn’t capture them in our data
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4.2 Vulnerability for different shocks
Figure 4: Global vulnerability, H, as a function of shock on external assets. “First round”
corresponds to H(1), identical across all models. Second round, H(∞), for each
of the five models. Simulation on a unique realization of the interbank network in
2010-Q2.
The dependence of second round effects on the size of the initial shock is another important
aspect of contagion models.
In Figure 4 we plotted first round effects and second round effects for the aDR, RV,
DC and EN models as functions of shock on all external assets in 2010-Q2 for a given
realization of the interbank network in that quarter. It can be seen how shocks and
second round effects are, quite intuitively, not trivially proportional, in fact as the shock
is increased the fraction of losses incurred during the first round becomes predominant,
literally leaving smaller and smaller amounts of equity for the second round to deplete.
For small shocks (s < 1.5%) the RV, EN and DC models capture no significant second
round losses, because the shock is so small that virtually no bank is in default and therefore
no bank can propagate distress. The aDR and cDR on the other hand, accounting for
CVA, show second round losses due to mark-to-market accounting even for those shocks.
The relationship between fraction of defaulted banks and shocks is presented for the very
same simulation in Figure 5, where it can be seen that it takes a certain fraction of first
round defaults to trigger second round losses under the EN, RV and DC models.
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Figure 5: Fraction of defaulted banks in the system as a function of shock on external assets.
“First round” corresponds to fraction of banks defaulted under the external shock
and is identical across all models. Fraction of defaulted banks at second round is
shown for each of the five models. Simulation on a unique realization of the interbank
network in 2010-Q2.
For medium sized shocks (1.5% < s < 3%) the second round effects of every model,
except aDR and cDR, are strongly network-dependent. Losses are triggered depending on
whether or not certain well-connected institutions are shocked and different shocks imply
different defaults at first round. This in particular implies that to compute expected
monetary losses from a stress-test based on these models with reasonable accuracy, full
and exact knowledge of the underlying interbank network must be assumed.
For large shocks (s > 3%) the models converge roughly to a common estimate of second
round losses, due to the fact that the majority of banks have, by now, defaulted at the
first round and are all able to propagate financial distress to the few solvent counterparties
left.
4.3 Vulnerability for different recovery rates
Mark-to-market contagion models, like aDR and cDR, tend to yield substantially higher
vulnerabilities. An important connection between mark-to-market models and the other
ones is given by the recovery rate.
In Figure 6 we present results similar to those in Figure 4, but for three distinct values
of the recovery rate and only for the particularly interesting cases of the aDR and RV
models. As can be seen the models tend to converge to the same distribution of second
20
round effects for sufficiently large shocks, remaining substantially different only for small
shocks.
Figure 6: Global vulnerability as a function of shock on external assets. First round and second
round for aDR and RV for increasing values of the recovery rate. Simulation on a
unique realization of the interbank network in 2010-Q2.
5 Discussion and policy relevance
By introducing a common framework (based on the notion of leverage network) for several
contagion models, we prove analytical results about the amount of contagion in a set of fi-
nancial institutions with interconnected liabilities. In particular, the ordering relationship
we find is suitable to compare models as it holds regardless of the network structure.
Overall, our results point towards the conclusion that the level of systemic losses aris-
ing from interconnectedness crucially depends on the amount of information about the
network structure, coupled with the expected recovery rate on the liabilities. We find
that systemic effects are increasing in the levels of uncertainty and exacerbated by an
interconnected system.
We show that the well-known Eisenberg and Noe contagion model is conservative, in
the sense that initial losses are not amplified by the network of liabilities but merely
redistributed. Adopting this type of approach to “clear” liabilities during a crisis would
be then desirable in order to reduce systemic losses to a minimum level. As losses would
be in great part limited and fully absorbed by individual equity cushions, this would put
21
Figure 7: Fraction of defaulted banks as a function of shock on external assets. First round and
second round for aDR and RV for increasing values of the recovery rate. Simulation
on a unique realization of the interbank network in 2010-Q2.
into a new perspective both the notions of “too big to fail” and “too interconnected to
fail”.
However, as we have discussed, for the EN approach to be applied, a series of conditions
need to be satisfied. In particular, it requires full knowledge of the network of liabilities.
These specific condition was not present, for example, when the 2007-2008 crisis ensued.
As Haldane (2009) points out, the financial system came to a “standstill” after Lehman’s
default, as its position in the CDS market “was believed” to be large. Back then, this
implied two levels of uncertainty: the first is about the value of external assets, the second
is about the network of exposures, thus making almost impossible to implement the EN
approach in that setting.
This leads to an important policy implication of our work. As an EN-like model is more
desirable to curb systemic losses, how could it be applied in a real setting?
First, more data at the level of individual positions should be made available to policy-
makers. The increase in data reporting is indeed the road taken by recent reforms such as
the European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) for OTC derivatives in the Eu-
ropean Union22 and the Dodd Frank Act in the US. Policymakers should then investigate
the key aspects of the financial network, including mapping “risk flows” (D’Errico et al.,
2016) and the “geography or risk”.23
22http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32012R0648
23As the Governor of the Central bank of Ireland Philip R. Lane has very recently pointed out in a
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Second, encouraging the possibility of setting up specific institutional arrangements or
post-trade infrastructures, under these conditions, would greatly help in applying to its
fullest the EN algorithm and limit the losses. These arrangements would need to be
ideally legally binding (at least to a certain extent). In this situation, the system would
be able to move towards more and more conservative losses. In the presence of the correct
type and amount of data, the regulator or the infrastructure would be able to enforce
almost instantaneously the payments due by each participant in order to minimise losses.
If correctly put in place (despite the natural operational difficulties), this policy (data
availability) can prove to be helpful for mitigation. This operation could also include
market players directly: Nobel laureate E. Fama has recently suggested that, during the
crisis, market participants could have even “unscrambled everything” in “a week or two”.24
As a more long-term objective, it would be even possible to run a real-time clearing of
the financial system that would help policymakers to understand the build up of systemic
distress.
However, our work provides only theoretical support and not yet an operative solution
on how to achieve this. Further work is necessary to bring the theoretical finding to
a fully operative level. We are aware that a complete conservation of losses may be
not fully achieved when the maturity structure and the complexity of financial products
grows: micro and macroprudential policies should continue taking such complexity into
account. Efforts in this direction include pre-trade activities such as central clearing
(Abad et al., 2016) and post-trades practices such as compression (D’Errico and Roukny,
2016), which are becoming increasingly adopted by market participants, and leading to a
more structured system.
speech http://www.bis.org/review/r160610b.pdf.
24http://www.newyorker.com/news/john-cassidy/interview-with-eugene-fama
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SI Supplementary Information
SI.1 Five contagion models
We now briefly present the five contagion models analyzed in the paper within the general
stress-testing framework presented in Section 2.1.
SI.1.1 Eisenberg-Noe model (EN)
The Eisenberg-Noe model was first introduced in Eisenberg and Noe (2001) as a clearing
payment mechanism for a network of financial institutions in which some nodes had
defaulted. The EN model addresses this issue by determining the payments institutions
have to make in order to minimize individual and collective losses, under the assumptions
of absence of bankrutpcy costs and liquidation costs. As such it is not a model specifically
designed for stress-testing, but has been used extensively in recent literature (see Elsinger
et al. (2006), Glasserman and Young (2015), among many others) exactly for this purpose.
We briefly review the main definitions and results, connecting them with our general
framework formulation.
In the same context of the financial system described in Section 2, define the total obli-
gations vector p¯, with components
p¯i =
n∑
j=1
Lbij + L
e
i
as the total liabilities of bank i, both internal and external to the network, with equal
seniority.25 Let
Πij =
{
Lij/p¯i if p¯i > 0
0 otherwise
(12)
be the relative liabilities matrix. This matrix represents the relative value of nominal
liabilities of bank i to bank j as a proportion of the debtor’s total liabilities. Generally Π
is a row sub-stochastic matrix, unless external liabilities are zero, in which case Π is row
stochastic. Define Aei as the external assets of bank i, so that the net worth of a bank is
25In the original formulation of the model (Eisenberg and Noe, 2001) banks are assumed to have no
external liabilities. However, a system in which βi = 1∀i is incompatible with a system for all banks
have leverage strictly larger than one: only-lenders banks must have unit leverage. However, banks
are naturally deposit-collecting institutions from the real economy. So having a fraction 1 − βi > 0 of
deposits over total liabilities represents a more realistic choice. Hence, we present here a reformulation of
the model used in virtually all recent works in the field, that is the natural extension of the old model in
the presence of external liabilities and proportionality of payments. For more details, see Elsinger et al.
(2013) and for an application see Glasserman and Young (2015).
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given by
E˜i(p¯) =
n∑
j=1
ΠTij p¯j + A
e
i − p¯i (13)
This expression corresponds to the book-value of the equity of the bank, Ei, only in case
E˜i(p¯) is non-negative. If it is strictly negative, then it indicates that the bank’s assets
are less than its liabilities, which means that the bank is insolvent and cannot honor its
liabilities completely and creditors will therefore necessarily accept debt write-offs.
Let us now introduce the payment vector, p, representing all payments of bank i to
debtholders, both internal and external to the network. In general not all payments
vectors will be feasible, in the sense that for an arbitrary choice banks might be required
to pay more than they hold in assets or less than their liabilities.
Eisenberg and Noe (2001) have proved, under fairly general conditions, the existence
and uniqueness of a clearing payment vector, i.e. a particular payment vector that satis-
fies the basic accounting principles of: i) limited liabitility, ii) absolute priority, and iii)
proportionality of claims; that is
p∗i = min
{ n∑
j=1
ΠTijp
∗
j + A
e
i , p¯i
}
. (14)
Such a clearing payment vector can be found through a discrete-time algorithm, called
Fictitious Default Algorithm. This algorithm, starting from the candidate payment vector
p¯, produces a sequence of plausible payment vectors, p(t), until convergence is reached in
maximum n (i.e. the number of nodes in the network) iterations. At convergence, the
clearing payment vector p∗ = p(∞) thus yields to:
Ei(∞) =
{
0 if pi = p¯i∑n
j=1 Π
T
ijpj(∞) + Aei − pi(∞) otherwise.
(15)
Notice that at convergence the equity of defaulted banks is necessarily zero. From now on
we will always indicate the clearing payment vector with the symbol p(∞), to stress that
we will work solely with the discrete-time Fictitious Default Algorithm implementation
of the model, in agreement with the remarks made in Section 2.2.
A key quantity in our framework is the endogenous recovery rate, defined as
pj(∞)/p¯j ∈ [0, 1] (16)
which determines the fraction of nominal value of liabilities that bank j can effectively
repay to its creditors once the system is cleared. For non-defaulting banks this value is
always 1.
The algorithm can be used in stress-testing, as we do, by “shocking” the external assets
of banks by a given fraction, si, so that the equity at t = 1 is
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E˜i(1) = max
{
0,
n∑
j=1
ΠTij p¯j + (1− si)Aei − p¯i
}
and from t = 2 the Fictitious Default Algorithm starts on the shocked balance sheets, so
that at the t-th step the equities read
E˜i(t) = max
{
0,
n∑
j=1
ΠTijpj(t) + (1− si)Aei − pi(t)
}
, (17)
SI.1.2 Rogers-Veraart model (RV)
The Rogers-Veraart model (Rogers and Veraart, 2013) is a generalization of the Eisenberg-
Noe model that takes into account bankruptcy and liquidation costs. Equation 14 can be
modified to account for these effects in the following way:
p∗i = min
{
β
n∑
j=1
ΠTijp
∗
j + αA
e
i , p¯i
}
, (18)
where α is a coefficient quantifying the fraction of nominal value of the external assets
recovered after liquidation costs (recovery rate on external assets) and β quantifies the
fraction of nominal value of interbank assets that the defaulted bank can recover after
bankruptcy costs or, alternatively, corresponds to a discount factor on the liquidated
interbank claim due to early settlement.
Rogers and Veraart show that the results of existence and uniqueness of the clearing pay-
ment vector are true also for this extension of the model and a straightforward variation of
the Fictitious Default Algorithm allows efficient computation in exactly the same fashion.
We will always deal with the case α = β and denote this common value26 by β. This
parameter β can be interpreted as an additional multiplicative factor that compounds the
endogeneous recovery rate obtained through the algorithm, the latter being computed as
in Equation 16.
SI.1.3 Default Cascades model (DC)
An alternative approach to the one proposed by Eisenberg and Noe is that of modelling
the propagation of losses from defaulted banks to counterparties directly in terms of a
contagion process on the equity of banks. This approach was followed in Battiston et al.
(2016c) and Battiston et al. (2012a).
26This assumption leads to substantial improvements in mathematical tractability and for this reason
it is also made, for example, in Glasserman and Young (2015).
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Using the definitions of vulnerability outlined in Section 2, we define recursively a discrete-
time dynamic process on the graph given by the following equation:
hi(t+ 1) = min
{
1, hi(t) +
∑
j∈A(t)
(1−R)lbijhj(t)
}
,
where lbij = A
b
ij/Ei(0) is the interbank leverage of bank i towards bank j, R is the exoge-
nous recovery rate, and A(t) is the set of active nodes at time t, that is the set of nodes
that can propagate distress at time t+ 1, defined as
A(t) = {j | hj(t) = 1 and hj(t′) < 1, ∀t′ < t}.
The process is easily explained as follows. When bank j defaults, that is hj(t) = 1, it
reduces its payments to counterparty i of a value (1 − R)Abij. This loss in asset value
is absorbed by the equity of its counterparty i and determines a relative equity loss of
magnitude (1 − R)Abij/Ei(0). If the total losses incurred by i up to time t + 1 exceed
the value of equity at t = 0, then hi(t + 1) = 1 and bank i, having exhausted its shock
buffer against losses, is itself in default. The peculiar definition of the set of active nodes
ensures that a node imparts losses to counterparties: i) only once, and ii) exactly at the
time step immediately following its default.
Once a bank has defaulted, its vulnerability will remain equal to one in all successive
iterations. Since losses are propagated on the simple directed graph induced by the
interbank nominal liabilities matrix and cycles are ignored, convergence to h(∞) is reached
after at most diam(L) iterations.27
SI.1.4 Acyclic DebtRank model (aDR)
All the models seen so far assume that losses are propagated exclusively by the default
event of a counterparty. In other words they assume that only defaults can determine a
loss in asset values on the balance sheets of counterparties.
Nevertheless, the current practice requires banks to implement a mark-to-market eval-
uation of their current claims against their respective counterparties. In the derivative
market, for instance, this goes under the name of Credit Valuation Adjustment (CVA).28
27The diameter diam(L) of the interbank network, is the maximum length of all shortest paths in the
network between any pair of nodes
28Introduced by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (2006) for US banks before the crisis and
subsequently internationally sanctioned by the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision (2010), CVA
is an instance of Fair Value Accounting (FVA), in that it involves reporting assets and liabilities on
the balance sheet at fair value and recognizing changes in fair value as gains and losses in the income
statement. All regulatory implementations require the use of mark-to-market (MtM) values for fair
value accounting, whenever available. In particular, CVA takes into account counterparty and credit risk
by requiring to explicitly account for the deterioration in creditworthiness of counterparties (according
27
In the case of a debt security, Abij, the expected value at time t of an interbank debt claim
of nominal value Abij will in general be given by
Vt(Abij) = pDj (t)RAbij︸ ︷︷ ︸
payoff given default
+(1− pDj (t))Abij (19)
where pDj (t) is the default probability of bank j estimated at time t and reflects the ability
of the counterparty to honor its debts.
This probability may reflect different sources of uncertainty influencing the likelihood that
the claim is actually paid (and in what amount). We envision here two main sources of
uncertainty: the first source relates to the potential changes in the external assets Aej of
the counterparty, which can be modeled as a stochastic process: Barucca et al. (2016)
provide a detailed account of this case and a formal relation with the standard structural
Merton approach in a network context. The second source of uncertainty relates to the
case in which the network of liabilities may be unknown (Haldane, 2009; Caballero and
Simsek, 2013) or may evolve after the shock. In this work we do not model these cases
explicitly, but we restrict our analysis to the fact that Vt(Abij) is the expect value of a
Bernoulli random variable as in Equation 19.
Several models are commonly used to estimate default probabilities.29 If we assume that
the default probability of a bank is equal to its individual vulnerability30, ie pDj (t) = hj(t),
to some plausible models). See, for instance, the BCBS Consultative Document on CVA at http:
//www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d325.pdf or the more recent EBA report at https://www.eba.europa.eu/
documents/10180/950548/EBA+Report+on+CVA.pdf. Since its early implementation CVA has attracted
numerous detractors (American Bankers Association, 2008; Wallison, 2008a,b). For a review on the
current state of the debate on FVA see Laux and Leuz (2009) and Laux and Leuz (2010) claiming that
such an endogenous revaluation of inter-financial claims could lead to, so called, downward spirals. A
downward spiral occurs when a small shock decreasing the equity of a single bank triggers massive asset
devaluations on the balance sheets of its counterparties, that are forced under CVA regulations to take
into account its increased default probability (in agreement with Merton (1974)). These devaluations,
in turn, determine further equity losses that keep propagating to higher-order counterparties along the
complex contractual interconnections of the financial system. In particular, notice that such a contagion
mechanism does not require actual defaults to act as triggers for distress propagation, being able to
generate substantial losses even in the absence of any bankruptcy. The change in a counterparty’s ability
to repay may influence not only the mark-to-market value of a claim, but also the amount of collateral the
counterparty may have to post: we do not tackle explicitly this problem in this paper, but the framework
can be extended also to this case.
29E.g. approaches based on the Merton model (Merton, 1974). Other methods use implied default
probabilities from the pricing of CDSs.
30In Battiston et al. (2016a) it is pointed out that an alternative choice would be to maintain that
pDj (t) = f(hj(t)), where f is a generic function of arbitrary form. The Acyclic DebtRank model, therefore,
simply corresponds to the simplest linear choice for f .
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we obtain the following financial distress propagation process:
hi(t+ 1) = min
{
1, hi(t) +
∑
j∈A(t)
(1−R)lbijhj(t)
}
where now, unlike the case of the DC model, the set of active nodes is defined as
A(t) = {j | hj(t) > 0 and hj(t′) = 0, ∀t′ < t}
This simple change in definition implies that banks can propagate distress as soon as they
lose a fraction of their equity, even before their default (as required by CVA). Nevertheless,
once a bank has propagated distress it will not be able to transmit further losses, despite
still being able to receive them. This is equivalent to saying that in the graph process
only first cycles are considered.
SI.1.5 Cyclic DebtRank (cDR)
The Cyclic DebtRank model was proposed in Bardoscia et al. (2015) as an extension of
the Acyclic DebtRank model to allow distress to be propagated along all paths in the
network, including all cycles. The extension also allows to overcome the mathematical
intractabilities resulting from the definition of the set of active nodes, A(t), in the Acyclic
DebtRank model, thus allowing a full exploitation of the linearity underlying the model,
with important consequences for the analysis of the stability of the system.31 The process
is defined as follows:
hi(t+ 1) = min
{
1, hi(t) +
n∑
j=1
(1−R)lbij
[
hj(t)− hj(t− 1)
]}
where now the set of active nodes has been removed and summation runs over all coun-
terparties.
SI.2 Analytical results on systemic losses
SI.2.1 Ordering relations between EN, RV, DC, DR
We will now present a series of propositions in order to clarify the ordering relation among
the different models in terms of individual and global vulnerabilities. This order relation
holds regardless of the network structure.32
31See (Battiston et al., 2016b), (Bardoscia et al., 2015), and (Bardoscia et al., 2016) for results con-
cerning the relevance of the spectral properties of the interbank leverage matrix for the stability of the
system
32The idea that the network structure alone does not determine the levels of contagion was explored
in Roukny et al. (2013) by means of simulations.
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The crucial step in this direction consists in re-expressing the Eisenberg-Noe and Rogers-
Veraart models, normally formulated in terms of payment vectors, as recursive processes
on individual vulnerabilities, hi(t). Proposition 1 partially provides such a variable trans-
formation, highlighting at the same time the importance of leverage as a key quantity for
quantifying distress propagation.
Proposition 1 (EN/RV in terms of leverage). The Einseberg-Noe and Rogers-Veraart
models can be re-expressed in terms of individual vulnerability as discrete-time processes
on the interbank leverage network in the following way:
hi(t+ 1) = min
{
1, hi(t) +
n∑
j=1
lbij
(
pj(t− 1)− pj(t)
p¯j
)}
where p(t) is the payment vector at the t-th iteration of the Fictitious Default Algorithm.
Proof. To prove the claim we simply follow the definitions of individual vulnerability
(Equation (4)) and net worth of a node (Equation (17)):
• If bank i has not defaulted up to time t+ 1, we can write
hi(t+ 1) =
Ei(0)− Ei(t+ 1)
Ei(0)
=
Ei(0)− Ei(t)
Ei(0)
+
Ei(t)− Ei(t+ 1)
Ei(0)
=
= hi(t) +
1
Ei(0)
( n∑
j=1
ΠTijpj(t− 1) +
+Aei − pi(t− 1)−
n∑
j=1
ΠTijpj(t)− Aei + pi(t)
)
.
Notice that the equity at time t is computed using the payment vector at time t−1,
in agreement with the implementation of the Fictitious Default Algorithm.
Now, because bank i has not defaulted by time t + 1, we know that its payment
vector has not changed, hence pi(t) = pi(t− 1). This implies
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hi(t+ 1) = hi(t) +
1
Ei(0)
( n∑
j=1
ΠTij(pj(t− 1)− pj(t))
)
= hi(t) +
1
Ei(0)
( n∑
j=1
Abij
p¯j
(pj(t− 1)− pj(t))
)
= hi(t) +
n∑
j=1
Abij
Ei(0)
pj(t− 1)− pj(t)
p¯j
= hi(t) +
n∑
j=1
lbij
pj(t− 1)− pj(t)
p¯j
.
• If the bank i defaulted at time t or before, then hi(t) = 1 and
min
{
1, hi(t) +
n∑
j=1
lbij
pj(t− 1)− pj(t)
p¯j
}
= 1
so that our expression yields the correct result hi(t+ 1) = 1, as required.
• If the default happens exactly at time t+1 then it suffices to notice that the reduced
inflow of payments on the interbank market has completely depleted the equity, that
is
n∑
j=1
ΠTij(pj(t− 1)− pj(t)) ≥ Ei(t)
this, in turn, implies that
hi(t) +
1
Ei(0)
n∑
j=1
ΠTij(pj(t− 1)− pj(t)) ≥ hi(t) +
Ei(t)
Ei(0)
= 1
so that, once again, by recognizing the leverage in the above expression, we have
min
{
1, hi(t) +
n∑
j=1
lbij
pj(t− 1)− pj(t)
p¯j
}
= 1
This completes our proof.
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Building on the results of Proposition 1, we can now compare the different models, iden-
tifying partial order relations in terms of final equity losses generated.
Proposition 2 shows that the EN model yields lower vulnerabilities than the RV model.
Its content is already well-known and is a simple consequence of the definition of the two
models, but we re-present it here in terms of individual vulnerabilities for completeness.
In Proposition 3 we prove that vulnerabilities generated by the cDR model are always
greater than the ones generated by the RV model, while Propositions 4 and 5 show that
no clear relationship exists between aDR and the remaining models can be derived, by
exhibiting counterexamples.
It should be emphasized nevertheless that the counterexample provided in Proposition 5
can be considered pathological, in the sense that initial balance sheet quantities have to be
fine-tuned in such a way as to obtain particularly vulnerable institutions on the interbank
market and carefully timed default waves (see comments at the end of the proof). In all
empirical implementations, in fact, vulnerabilities induced by aDR are larger than the
ones induced by EN.
Proposition 2 (EN ≤ RV). At every time t ≥ 1 the relation
hENi (t) ≤ hRVi (t)
is satisfied ∀i ∈ V , where t is the internal time of the algorithms. In particular this implies
that at convergence:
HEN(∞) ≤ HRV (∞)
Proof. We will first of all prove by induction that at each iteration of the Fictitious
Default Algorithm, the relation pRVi (t) ≤ pENi (t) is satisfied. At the beginning of the
algorithm, both models satisfy pRVi (1) = p
EN
i (1) = p¯i, thus constituting our inductive
basis. Now, suppose that pRVi (t) ≤ pENi (t) is true, we want to show that this implies
pRVi (t+ 1) ≤ pENi (t+ 1). This is immediate because by definition we have:
pENi (t+ 1) = min
{
p¯i,
n∑
j=1
ΠTijp
EN
j (t) + A
e
i
}
and
pRVi (t+ 1) = min
{
p¯i, R
( n∑
j=1
ΠTijp
RV
j (t) + A
e
i
)}
Given that β ∈ [0, 1], it follows that pRVi (t+ 1) ≤ pENi (t+ 1), thus proving our claim. We
now use this to prove that the inverse relationship holds on individual vulnerabilities, for
every t ≥ 1.
• If bank i has defaulted under the EN algorithm at time t or before, we have that
pENi (t) ≤ p¯i. By what we have just proved on payment vectors, we know that also
pRVi (t) ≤ p¯i and bank i has defaulted under RV as well. Therefore hENi (t + 1) =
hRVi (t+ 1) = 1, because vulnerabilities are non-decreasing in t.
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• If bank i has not defaulted at time t or before, we can write hi(t) in Proposition 1
explicitly, by solving backwards in time, thus obtaining:
hENi (t+ 1) = min
{
1, hENi (1) +
n∑
j=1
lbij
(
p¯j − pENj (t)
p¯j
)}
,
hRVi (t+ 1) = min
{
1, hRVi (1) +
n∑
j=1
lbij
(
p¯j − pRVj (t)
p¯j
)}
.
Clearly, since we have established that pRVi (t) ≤ pENi (t), for every t, and we know
that hRVi (1) = h
EN
i (1), we must have h
EN
i (t+ 1) ≤ hRVi (t+ 1).
A straightforward corollary, as already showed in Rogers and Veraart (2013) within their
framework, is that if β = 1, then hENi (t) = h
RV
i (t),∀t, which implies that HEN(∞) =
HRV (∞) if β = 1.
Proposition 3 (RV ≤ cDR). At every time t ≥ 1 the relation
hRVi (t) ≤ hcDRi (t)
is satisfied ∀i ∈ V , where t is the internal time of the algorithms, which implies that at
convergence:
HRV (∞) ≤ HcDR(∞)
Proof. We prove the claim by induction. For t = 1, we have that
hRVi (1) = h
cDR
i (1)
since first-round losses are identical for all models. Suppose the inequality holds at time
t, we show that this holds true also at time t+ 1. In fact:
• if hcDRi (t) = 1 =⇒ hRVi (t+1) ≤ 1 = hcDRi (t+1), because vulnerabilities are bounded
above by 1;
• if hcDRi (t) < 1 then the general formulas read
hcDRi (t+ 1) = min
{
1, hcDRi (t) +
∑n
j=1 l
b
ij
(
hcDRj (t)− hcDRj (t− 1)
)}
,
hRVi (t+ 1) = min
{
1, hRVi (t) +
∑n
j=1 l
b
ij
(
pj(t−1)−pj(t)
p¯j
)}
.
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But since hRVi (t) ≤ hcDRi (t) < 1 we can solve the telescopic sum in the second term
of the minimum operator, obtaining:33
hcDRi (t+ 1) = min
{
1, hcDRi (1) +
∑n
j=1 l
b
ijh
cDR
j (t)
}
,
hRVi (t+ 1) = min
{
1, hRVi (1) +
∑n
j=1 l
b
ij
(
p¯j−pj(t)
p¯j
)}
.
We know by the inductive step that hRVi (1) = h
cDR
i (1), so we will focus on the terms
in the summation. Now, notice that if counterparty j has defaulted under the cDR
algorithm by time t, then:
hcDRj (t) = 1 ≥
p¯j − pj(t)
p¯j
,
which follows from the fact that pj(t) ∈ [0, p¯j]. On the other hand, if counterparty
j has not defaulted under the cDR algorithm by time t, then
hRVj (t) ≤ hcDRj (t) < 1 =⇒ pj(t) = p¯j,
where the first inequality is true for the inductive hypothesis and the implication
is a simple consequence of the Fictitious Default Algorithm: if bank j is not in
default, then by priority of claim it must be able to pay its counterparties in full.
Once again, we obtain:
hcDRj (t) ≥
p¯j − pj(t)
p¯j
= 0
Putting these two inequalities together and recalling that hRVi (1) = h
cDR
i (1) is true,
we finally obtain:
hRVi (t+ 1) ≤ hcDRi (t+ 1).
Proposition 4 (DC  aDR). In general it does not hold that:
HDC(∞) ≤ HaDR(∞)
Proof. We will prove this by exhibiting a counterexample. Consider the following financial
system:
E(0) =
 515
25
 A(e) =
100100
100
 A(b) =
 0 0 2020 0 0
0 15 0

33It is assumed that hcDRi (0) = h
RV
i (0) = 0, ie. no bank is in default prior to the first round shock.
This amounts to exclude from the network all banks reporting a negative book-value of equity.
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12 3
20
15
20
If we shock all external assets by 10%, we obtain
haDR(1) =
 12/3
2/5
 haDR(2) =
 11
4/5
 and
hDC(1) =
 12/3
2/5
 hDC(2) =
 11
2/5
 hDC(3) =
11
1

So that HDC(∞) > HaDR(∞).
The counterexample works by constructing the network in such a way that two waves of
distress (one moderate and one more substantial) affect the system. Bank 2 is sent into
default by bank 1, but it is unable to propagate this distress onto 3 under aDR, because
it has already propagated the lesser distress coming from the first wave. Under DC, on
the other hand, bank 2 can now propagate its distress, which more than makes up for the
“lack of propagation” of the first wave.
It is worthwhile to point out that this example is not pathological in any sense: it is
routinely observed in our empirical results that, past a given external shock threshold
(high enough to send some banks into default at the first round), DC can in fact produce
much higher vulnerabilities than aDR.
Proposition 5 (EN  aDR). In general it does not hold that:
HEN(∞) ≤ HaDR(∞)
Proof. We will prove this by exhibiting a counterexample. Consider the following financial
network:
E(0) =
1535
35
 A(e) =
1005
20
 A(b) =
 0 0 050 0 0
0 20 0

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1 2 3
50 20
If we shock all external assets by 100%, we obtain
haDR(1) =
 11/7
4/7
 haDR(2) =
 11
32/49
 , and
hEN(1) =
 11/7
4/7
 hEN(2) =
 11
4/7
 hEN(3) =
11
1
 .
So that HEN(∞) > HaDR(∞).
This counterexample exploits the same features analyzed in Proposition 4. Clearly in
order for the same principle to work in the case of the EN algorithm, the financial system
has to be particularly vulnerable to interbank contagion, so that this counterexample
cannot be considered typical of empirical data in any sense and it has been built ad hoc.
In actual implementations, we see that aDR always leads to higher vulnerabilities. This
counterexample, in fact, is significant only insofar as it increases our understanding of
the limitations of the aDR dynamics w.r.t. the cDR dynamics. In particular, in Section
SI.1.5, while introducing the cDR model, we briefly pointed out the importance of this
definition of active nodes.
SI.2.2 Conservation of losses in EN
We will now derive analytical results for the Eisenberg-Noe model that are key to our anal-
ysis. In particular in Proposition 6 we derive an exact expression for the final vulnerability
of the system at convergence, HEN(∞), that will be subsequently used in Proposition 8
to obtain an upper bound for the second round losses in equity.
Proposition 6 (Analytical expression for HEN(∞)). Let si be the shock on the external
assets of the i-th bank, then
HEN(∞) = 1∑n
i=1Ei(0)
n∑
i=1
(
A
(e)
i si − (1− βi)(p¯i − pi(∞))
)
where p(∞) is the clearing payment vector at convergence and βi := L(b)i /(L(b)i + L(e)i ) ∈
[0, 1] is the ratio34 between interbank liabilities and total liabilities of bank i.
34This coefficient is obviously of great importance, as already highlighted by Glasserman and Young
(2015), and is known as financial connectivity
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Proof. At convergence the clearing payment vector satisfies Equation 14 in Section SI.1.1,
i.e.
pi(∞) = min
{ n∑
j=1
ΠTijpj(∞) + Aei (1− si), p¯i
}
so that the final equity of bank i is
Ei(∞) =
n∑
j=1
ΠTijpj(∞) + A(e)i (1− si)− pi(∞)
We also notice that at t = 0 we have:35
Etot(0) =
n∑
i=1
Ei(0) =
n∑
i=1
( n∑
j=1
ΠTij p¯j + A
(e)
i − p¯i
)
=
=
n∑
j=1
n∑
i=1
ΠTij p¯j +
n∑
i=1
A
(e)
i −
n∑
i=1
p¯i =
=
n∑
j=1
βj p¯j +
n∑
i=1
A
(e)
i −
n∑
i=1
p¯i =
=
n∑
j=1
(βj − 1)p¯j +
n∑
i=1
A
(e)
i
Putting the two equations together, we obtain
HEN(∞) = Etot(0)− Etot(∞)
Etot(0)
=
=
1∑n
i=1Etot(0)
n∑
i=1
(
(βi − 1)p¯i + A(e)i − (βi − 1)pi(∞)− A(e)i (1− si)
)
=
=
1∑n
i=1Etot(0)
n∑
i=1
(
A
(e)
i si − (1− βi)(p¯i − pi(∞))
)
.
Therefore the total cumulative relative equity loss of the system equals the total loss in
assets at the first round minus the shortfall in payments to external debtholders, that are
forced to endure a certain amount of writing-off of debt.
Proposition 7 (Second round losses in EN). Let si be the shock on the external assets
of the i-th bank, then the exact expression for the cumulative relative equity loss incurred
as second round effect is given by
35Assuming no bank is in default prior to the first round shock
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HEN(∞)−HEN(1) = 1∑n
i=1Ei(0)
[ ∑
i∈D(1)
(
A
(e)
i si − Ei(0)
)
−
n∑
i=1
(1− βi)(p¯i − pi(∞))
]
where D(1) = {i ∈ V |si > 1/lei } is the set of defaulted banks at the first round.
The result can be interpreted as saying that total equity loss during the second round is
exactly equal to the loss in assets at the first round in excess of equity minus the shortfall
in payments to external debtholders, which represents that fraction of the initial shock that
is ultimately absorbed by entities outside of the network.
Proof. From Proposition (6) we know
HEN(∞) = 1∑n
i=1 Ei(0)
n∑
i=1
(
Aeisi − (1− βi)(p¯i − pi(∞))
)
A direct computation of HEN(1) yields
HEN(1) =
1∑n
i=1Ei(0)
n∑
i=1
(
Ei(0) min {1, lei si}
)
,
where lei := A
e
i/Ei(0) is the external leverage of bank i. Therefore:
HEN(∞)−HEN(1) = 1∑n
i=1 Ei(0)
[ n∑
i=1
(
Aeisi − (1− βi)(p¯i − pi(∞))
)
+
−
n∑
i=1
Ei(0) min{1, lei si}
]
=
=
1∑n
i=1 Ei(0)
[ n∑
i=1
(
Aeisi − (1− βi)(p¯i − pi(∞))
)
+
−
∑
i∈D(1)
Ei(0)−
∑
i∈D(1)c
A
(e)
i si
]
=
=
1∑n
i=1 Ei(0)
[ ∑
i∈D(1)
(
Aeisi − Ei(0)
)
−
n∑
i=1
(1− βi)(p¯i − pi(∞))
]
,
which proves our claim.
Notice that the expression proved in Proposition 7 will in general depend on the clearing
payment vector p(∞), since we cannot know in advance how much of the external debt
will be written off. We are therefore interested in finding an upper bound of this quantity
that is independent of p(∞) at convergence.
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Proposition 8 (Upper bound on second round losses in EN). Under the hypotheses of
Proposition 7 we have an upper bound on the losses at the second round given by:
HEN(∞)−HEN(1) ≤ 1∑n
i=1Ei(0)
∑
i∈D(1)
βi
(
Aeisi − Ei(0)
)
.
Proof. Without knowing anything about p(∞), we can nevertheless say that:
p¯i − pi(∞) ≥
{
Aeisi − Ei(0) if i ∈ D(1)
0 otherwise
,
in fact those banks that defaulted at the first round will have at least a shortfall in
payments equal to the amount of lost assets in excess of equity, while we conservatively
assume that all other banks will not default after the first round. This conservative
estimates leads us to an upper bound for the second round effects given by:
HEN(∞)−HEN(1) = 1∑n
i=1Ei(0)
[ ∑
i∈D(1)
(
Aeisi − Ei(0)
)
−
n∑
i=1
(1− βi)(p¯i − pi(∞))
]
=
≤ 1∑n
i=1Ei(0)
[ ∑
i∈D(1)
(
Aeisi − Ei(0)
)
+
−
∑
i∈D(1)
(1− βi)(Aeisi − Ei(0))
]
=
=
1∑n
i=1Ei(0)
∑
i∈D(1)
βi
(
Aeisi − Ei(0)
)
.
The intuition behind this upper bound is that the second round losses absorbed by the
system will be equal to at most a fraction of the losses in assets in excess of equity, the
factor of proportionality being exactly the financial connectivity coefficients of the banks
hit at the first round.
Further calculations on the bound provided in Proposition 8 lead to the rewrite the upper
bound as follows:
HEN(∞)−HEN(1) ≤ 1∑n
i=1Ei(0)
∑
i∈D(1)
βi
(
Aeisi − Ei(0)
)
=
=
∑
i∈D(1)
βi
(
lei
Ei(0)∑n
j=1Ei(0)
si − Ei(0)∑n
i=1Ei(0)
)
=
=
∑
i∈D(1)
βiwi (l
e
i si − 1)
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where lisi−1 is the the loss in excess of equity and it’s always larger than zero by the way
D(1) is defined, and wi = Ei(0)/Etot(0) is the weight of bank i in terms of total network
equity. This formulation allows to interpret the second round losses as the weighted
average of the individual excess losses at the first round on the subset of banks defaulted
at the first round.
SI.3 Illustrative examples on EN
SI.3.1 Mutualization of losses
We now present some examples in order to clarify the process of losses mutualization in
the network under the EN model. Consider a directed wheel graph on n vertices, with
n ≥ 2, shown in Figure 8 for the case n = 4. Order the vertices {1, . . . , n}. Suppose
there are two classes of banks with different balance sheets. The first node, occupying the
center of the wheel, is a fragile bank, with balance sheet:
Ae1 = 75(n− 1), Ab1 = 0
E1(0) = 5(n− 1), Lb1 = 10(n− 1), Le1 = 60(n− 1)
while the remaining n− 1 banks are more capitalized:
Aei = 50(n− 1), Abi = 15(n− 1)
Ei(0) = 10(n− 1), Lbi = 5(n− 1), Lei = 50(n− 1), for i = 2, . . . , n
The balance sheet quantities are consistent for every value of n ≥ 2 and are linearly
increasing with the size of the network. The figure below shows such a wheel graph for
n = 4. The bank shown in red is the fragile bank at the center of the wheel.
2
1
3 4
10
10 10
15 15
15
Figure 8: Wheel graph for n = 4.
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Assume an initial shock of s = 10% impacts the external assets of the first bank, making
it default. We can readily compute the individual vulnerability of the remaining banks
hENi (∞) =
(Ae1s− E1(0))β1
n− 1 ·
1
Ei(0)
=
3.75%
n− 1 , for i = 2, . . . , n
Notice that the n − 1 factor at the denominator implies that all losses in excess of bank
1 equity are fully mutualized among the counterparties. Computing the final global
vulnerability yields to:
HEN(∞) = (n− 1) 10(n− 1)
10(n− 1)2 + 5(n− 1) ·
3.57%
(n− 1)+
+
5(n− 1)
10(n− 1)2 + 5(n− 1) =
1.075
2(n− 1) + 1 .
As the number of counterparties increases the default of the more fragile institution in-
duces less and less distress in the network, since losses are mutualized among a greater
number of counterparties.
SI.3.2 Invariance with respect to network topology
From Proposition 8, we know that the second round global vulnerability under the EN
model admits the following bound, independently of the underlying network topology
HEN(∞)−HEN(1) ≤ 1∑n
i=1Ei(0)
∑
i∈D(1)
βi
(
A
(e)
i si − Ei(0)
)
We will now apply this bound to three simple networks with different topologies, as in
Figure 9, and show how the second round under EN is in fact independent of the network
structure.
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1 2 3 4
15 15 15
(a) Chain graph
2
1
3 4
5
5 5
(b) Star graph
12
3 4
15
15
15
15
(c) Directed cyclic graph
Figure 9: Examples of different topologies on simple 4-vertices graphs
In each of the graphs shown, the first node (colored in red) corresponds to a fragile bank
with balance sheet
Ae1 = 80, L
e
1 = 60, L
b
1 = 15, E1(0) = 5.
The remaining three banks have equities Ei(0) = 10, i = 2, 3, 4, while the interbank
linkages are shown on the graphs themselves. Assume that an initial shock s = 10%
impacts only the external assets of bank 1, leading to its default. Before considering the
topology of the network and only by looking at the balance sheet quantities provided, we
know that:
HEN(∞)−HEN(1) ≤ 1∑n
i=1Ei(0)
∑
i∈D(1)
βi
(
A
(e)
i si − Ei(0)
)
=
1
35
· 15
60
· 4 = 1.71%.
In other words, the second round losses cannot be higher than 1.71% of the total initial
equity. Indeed, a direct computation of the individual vulnerabilities induced by the
initial shock in the cases of Figures 9a, 9b, and 9c leads to the following results
a) hEN(∞) =

1
0.06
0
0
 , b) hEN(∞) =

1
0.02
0.02
0.02
 , c) hEN(∞) =

1
0.06
0
0
 .
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In all three cases, despite the differences in the vulnerabilities of individual banks and
independently from the topology, the final result is:
HEN(∞)−HEN(1) = 1.71% and HEN(∞) = 16%
that is, the bound is satisfied strictly in the case of all three topologies.
The reason why the bound is achieved exactly is that, in the particular cases of these
examples, only one wave of defaults is triggered, namely the default of bank 1 at time
t = 1. If further defaults are induced, the second round is even smaller due to the fact
that at each successive default a fraction of losses is absorbed by the external debtholders
of the defaulting institution, thus reducing the conservative flow in and absorption by the
network.
(1 − β1) (Ae1s− E1)
Ae1 × s
E1
β1 × (Ae1s− E1)
Aesys =∑
iA
e
i
Absys =∑
iA
b
i
Asys =
∑
iAi Lsys =
∑
i Li
Esys =∑
iEi
Lesys =∑
i L
e
i
Lbsys =∑
i L
b
i
First round losses of external asset of bank 1
First round losses absorbed by bank 1
Second round losses absorbed by counterparties
Second round losses absorbed by external debtholders
Writing-off of interbank debt
Figure 10: Aggregated balance sheet for networks in Figures 9a, 9b, 9c and corresponding
dynamics for the EN model. Notice that the dynamics is completely network-
independent
It’s worth emphasizing that the final global vulnerability value is the same as if we ag-
gregated all balance sheets, as in Figure 10.
The initial losses induced by the shock in external assets of bank 1, are partially shoulders
by bank 1 equity. Then a fraction β1 of losses in excess is passed to its counterparties, while
a fraction 1− β1 is passed onto the external debtholders, thus leaving the network. The
losses affecting counterparties then cascade through the network and, if they cause further
defaults, are proportionally diminished by the fraction absorbed by external debtholders.
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To see how the underlying topology could affect and truly amplify the propagation of
losses, let’s analyze the case of the aDR model, in which the results are clearly topology-
dependent. From simple computations we obtain:
a) haDR(∞) =

1
0.75
0.56
0.42
 , b) haDR(∞) =

1
0.75
0.75
0.75
 , c) haDR(∞) =

1
0.75
0.56
0.42

so that
a) HaDR(∞) = 0.64, b) HaDR(∞) = 0.79, c) HaDR(∞) = 0.64
In the case of the aDR model the advantages and disadvantages of the different topologies
emerge clearly. Naturally enough aDR is a first-cycles process, so that the chain in Figure
9a and the cycle in Figure 9c produce exactly the same final vulnerabitlity. But the star
graph in Figure 9b leads to higher vulnerabilities, because the fragile node is able to
trasmit its distress to the highest possible number of counterparties. Indeed the systemic
risk posed by a star network configuration of this kind is well known and widely debated
in the literature on CCPs (Central Clearing Counterparties).
SI.4 Data collection and processing
Our dataset comes from the Bureau Van Dijk Bankscope database36. We focus on a
representative subset of the 285 EU listed banks, for which we obtained individual balance
sheet data37 on a quarterly basis from 2005-Q4 to 2015-Q3.
Missing data was a big concern for the full dataset 0f 285 institutions. Table 3 summarizes
the percentages of banks affected by missing values at the end of each year for all the
balance sheet quantities analyzed. Percentages of missing values in the equity time series
range from 3.17% to 93.31% of all quarters among individual banks, with a mean of
(46.86± 29.70)% missing values for the average bank. The time series of interbank data
is typically even sketchier, showing (9.32 ± 7.58)% more missing values than the equity
time series. Finally data on derivatives and impaired loans has the worst coverage of all
quantities analyzed.
Furthermore, despite a positive trend in time that shows higher and more frequent cov-
erage, most banks tend to publish data solely at end or mid-year periods (see Table 4).
Therefore we focus on a subset of the original dataset and select the top 50 banks by total
assets in 2013-Q4, so as to maximize data coverage (bigger institutions tend to report more
36URL: bankscope.bvdinfo.com
37In details: we downloaded the following fields from the Universal Banking Model (UBM) of
Bankscope. 1) “Total Equity”, 2) “Total assets”, 3) “Loans and Advances to Banks”, 4) “Deposits
from Banks”, 5) “Total Loans”, 6) “Memo: Total Impaired Loans”, 7) “Derivatives”
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Quantity 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Equity &
Assets
23.16 16.84 15.09 12.28 11.23 8.07 3.86 3.51 3.16 5.96 76.84
Interbank &
External
Assets
38.25 34.74 34.39 32.28 30.88 28.42 24.91 23.86 23.86 25.61 82.11
Interbank
Liabilities
36.49 31.58 32.98 30.55 28.77 27.37 23.31 24.21 25.26 27.72 81.75
Derivatives
59.65 55.09 51.93 49.82 50.18 48.42 41.05 36.84 35.09 38.25 85.96
Impaired
Loans
68.07 64.91 60.70 59.65 55.79 52.28 44.56 38.95 38.25 41.05 89.12
Table 3: Percentages of banks with unavailable values in the full dataset of 285 listed EU banks
at each year-end. Breakdown by balance sheet quantity.
Quantity Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Equity
Assets
70.62 35.02 68.33 16.36
Interbank and
External
Assets
72.85 48.96 70.81 34.48
Interbank
Liabilities
73.75 48.48 71.90 33.65
Derivatives 82.14 61.50 81.02 50.21
Impaired
Loans
87.21 73.72 86.22 55.76
Table 4: Percentages of banks failing to report balance sheet quantitied in the full dataset of
285 listed EU banks. Breakdown by balance sheet quantity and quarter. Percentages
at fixed quarter refer to averages on specified quarter of all years in the dataset.
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data, more often) and obtain a representative sample of the EU banking system. Table
5 is analogous to Table 3 and shows the clear gain in data coverage for this restriction of
the dataset.
Quantity 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Interbank
Liabilities
1.40 0.35 0.00 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 1.05 9.47
Derivatives 1.40 0.35 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.35 10.53
Impaired
Loans
3.86 1.75 0.70 0.70 0.70 1.05 0.35 0.35 0.70 0.70 1.93
All other
quantities
1.40 ≤ 0.35 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 ≤ 0.35 ≤ 8.77
Table 5: Percentages of banks with unavailable values in the restricted dataset of top 50 listed
EU banks by total assets. Breakdown by balance sheet quantity. Percentage refer to
end-of-year data.
Bigger banks indeed tend to report their balance sheet data more frequently and more
consistently, thus restricting to the subset of the top 50 banks by assets leads to a dra-
matic improvement in data quality. Table 6 shows the percentage of basic balance sheet
quantities covered by our selection of top 50 banks with respect to the original dataset of
285 banks. Indeed this subsample is shown to be representantive of the whole EU banking
system in absolute terms, since most of equity and assets is concentrated in these bigger
institutions.
For this choice of dataset the time series of total assets is complete. For some problematic
banks, the equity and total loans series present an average of (23.15 ± 22.66)% missing
data points but never more than three of them consecutively therefore they have been
completely reconstructed by simple linear interpolation.
In the case of missing interbank assets data we performed an estimation via linear inter-
polation on interbank leverages available for other years. The choice of interpolating on
interbank leverages instead of directly interpolating on interbank assets is due to the fact
that the former are more stable in time, being ideally free of any trend, and can be easily
obtained from the equity time series, which is complete.
Analogously, for missing interbank liabilities we interpolated on the fraction of interbank
liabilities to total liabilities, which is also more stable in time than the corresponding
time series on interbank liabilities and allows to fully exploit the completely reconstructed
liabilities time series (difference between assets and equity).
Finally, missing impaired loans have been reconstructed by linearly interpolating on the
fraction of impaired loans to total loans.
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Quantity 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Equity 82.45 82.46 82.09 83.57 84.07 81.38 80.53 82.29 80.16 81.03 89.97
Assets 94.23 93.99 94.52 94.00 91.78 89.83 89.30 89.09 88.38 89.50 92.89
Interbank
Assets
94.42 93.68 93.96 87.31 82.37 85.98 82.42 80.50 84.19 86.02 72.68
Interbank
Liabilities
95.13 94.12 93.81 90.55 85.59 82.76 84.67 83.81 78.80 83.03 93.99
Derivatives 99.36 99.36 99.44 99.40 98.90 97.70 97.52 96.92 97.08 97.69 99.44
Impaired
Loans
89.80 92.80 94.39 93.68 92.31 91.37 89.40 87.32 86.16 87.94 90.65
External
Assets
95.77 95.96 95.90 95.44 93.82 91.50 91.32 90.75 90.03 91.18 93.84
Table 6: Coverage of balance sheet quantities by the restricted dataset of top 50 listed EU
banks with respect to the original dataset of 285 banks. Breakdown by balance sheet
quantity. Percentages refer to end-of-year data.
SI.5 Network reconstruction
Detailed bilateral exposures between individual institutions are typically confidential.
Several works on national interbank networks have used real bilateral data collected by
national central banks, but at the larger EU-level there is no comprehensive dataset avail-
able.
At each point in time we reconstruct 1, 000 interbank networks from aggregate data of the
individual banks in our dataset. For the reconstruction of the adjacency matrix we follow
the “fitness model” outlined in de Masi et al. (2006), Musmeci et al. (2013) and Montagna
and Lux (2016), which allows to replicate a core-periphery topology typical of interbank
markets. The weighted adjacency matrix is then obtained by calculating weights using a
proportional fitting algorithm introduced in Battiston et al. (2016a).
More in detail, the procedure is as follows:
• Total exposure rebalancing. Our dataset represents only a subset of the entire
interbank market. We notice that total interbank assets, Ab =
∑
Abi , are systemat-
ically lower than total interbank liabilities, Lb =
∑
Lbi (ranging from a minimum of
59.4% to a maximum of 92.2%). This implies that the top 50 EU listed banks are
net borrowers. We take a conservative stand and assume that the volume of total
lending in the network is the minimum between the two, i.e. total interbank assets.
• Link assignment In agreement with the fitness model, define xi = 12
(Abi
Ab
+
Lbi
Lb
)
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as the “fitness” of bank i, which is a proxy for the importance of the bank in the
interbank market. We can then estimate the probability that a bilateral exposure
between bank i and bank j exists as pij =
zxixj
1+zxixj
. The parameter z is free and
is chosen in such a way that the average density is 20%, compatibly with the fact
that our top 50 EU listed banks represent the core of the interbank market and
are highly interlinked38. Subsequently, 1, 000 realizations of this prior matrix are
sampled, yielding 1, 000 adjacency matrices.
• Weight assignment The last step is that of assigning weights to each matrix.
Following the methodology presented in Battiston et al. (2016a) we impose the
constraint that the sum of exposures of each bank equals its total interbank assets,
Abi . We implement an iterative proportional fitting algorithm on the interbank
exposure matrix. In a nutshell, we wish to estimate the matrix piij = A
b
ij/A
b, which
is simply the matrix Abij normalized on the sum of all entries. Each iteration of the
fitting procedure consists of two steps:
1. pˆi′ij =
pˆiij∑
j pˆiij
Abi
Ab
2. pˆi′′ij =
pˆi′ij∑
i pˆi
′
ij
Lbi
Lb
The procedure stops as soon as
∑
j pˆiij − Abi/Ab and
∑
i pˆiij − Lbi/Lb are below 1%.
Finally the estimated weighted adjacency matrix is obtained as piij · Ab.
38We have performed robustness checks for this particular choice of density and noticed negligible
changes in results for lower densities
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